Antitrust Amnesia: How the NCAA Proved the Case Against Itself in Colorado

Updated: Aug 16
On July 31, 2026, Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney of the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado certified the Class of 2022 and granted the class an injunction, clearing the way for a fifth season. Once again, the NCAA demonstrates its complete legal blindspot regarding antitrust law.
The NCAA implemented a new rule—the Five-Year Eligibility Rule (“the Rule”)—that allowed all athletes to compete in five seasons of college sports, except for those athletes in the Class of 2022 who had already competed in four years of competition.

The NCAA reasoned that it would be unfair to incoming freshmen to allow the Class of 2022 to compete for a fifth year. NCAA brass thought college seniors staying to play another year would “destabilize college sports.” (Court Ruling (“CR”), p. 5). They see this situation as a zero-sum game, where all rosters are full and as one athlete leaves, another has a chance to join the team.
That foundation was proven incorrect, even by the NCAA’s own arguments.
Self-awareness is vital to growth, for persons and businesses. Despite numerous negative court decisions dating back to the 1980’s, the NCAA lacks all self-awareness as to its current legal standing or even its basic make-up as an entity. It’s vital for the NCAA’s survivability that it understands that it is a commercial enterprise; it has nothing to do with amateurism any longer. Because it’s a commercial enterprise, it is governed by strict antitrust laws. It can’t simply make up whatever rules it wants and everyone plays along; those days are long gone.
But still, it tries.
It should try harder.
Throughout Judge Sweeney’s 50-page ruling granting the Temporary Restraining Order (viewed as a Request for Preliminary Injunction), she noted several instances where the NCAA either had no real argument, made one that was counterproductive, or an argument was simply non-existent.
Here’s a list of those fledgling arguments:
Personal jurisdiction. The NCAA claimed the Colorado court lacked jurisdiction over it for two reasons. First, the NCAA argued the plaintiff-athletes could not prove that the NCAA “purposely directed its activities toward Colorado,” (CR 10) meaning the NCAA has nothing to do with the state of Colorado. The court had to explain to the NCAA that Colorado “is home to several NCAA and Division I schools.” (CR12).
The NCAA’s second argument against the court having jurisdiction was that “the Rule was promulgated from a deliberative process ‘facilitated from the NCAA’s headquarters in Indianapolis, Indiana.’” (CR 10). In other words, since they made the Rule in Indiana, only an Indiana court has jurisdiction. The court noted the NCAA "offers no evidentiary citation in support of this proposition," said the NCAA "cannot seriously dispute" that the Rule applies to Colorado schools (or other schools nationwide), and concluded the NCAA "presented no meaningful argument" on jurisdiction. (CR 10-12).
The procompetitive justification. The court held the NCAA's whole procompetitive theory "proceeds from a flawed premise: that excluding athletes from the labor market is actually procompetitive." (CR 38). The court seemed bewildered by the NCAA’s argument “that reducing laborers in a market is somehow procompetitive.” (CR 38). The court had to explain that “antitrust law does not endorse—or sustain—this understanding.”
The equity/"opening spots for freshmen" argument. The NCAA’s rationale for the Rule is that they have to give in-coming freshmen the roster spots. The court had to quote two cases that the NCAA seems to be ignoring: Alston and Board of Regents. The court explained, “Alston teaches that this line of thinking…bears little relevance in an antitrust inquiry.” (CR 39). The court then explained to the NCAA: "good motives will not validate an otherwise anticompetitive practice." (CR 40, citing Board of Regents).
Public interest. The NCAA had the opportunity to make an argument as to why the Rule was in the public’s interest. The court wrote: “The NCAA’s argument regarding this factor is limited to a header in its brief.” (CR 49). Just embarrassing.
The roster/"no price effect" claim. The NCAA argued the roster caps meant no decreased "price,” meaning the rosters are all full, and as one athlete leaves the roster, another joins. If they allowed athletes who played four years to get a fourth year, it would take away opportunities for in-coming freshmen. The court found that "the NCAA has put forth no evidence of this," (CR 35) and the actual evidence proves otherwise: ~55% of women's teams and ~23% of men's teams were below their roster caps, with thousands of open roster spots. (CR 34). The court noted, “the NCAA’s own evidentiary submission belies this all or nothing argument.” (CR 43).
The "bootstrapping" jurisdiction argument. The NCAA argued that even if jurisdiction is proper in Colorado as to some plaintiffs, it’s not proper for out-of-state plaintiffs. The court found that the cases the NCAA cited "undermine its own argument." (CR 13). The court had to explain to the NCAA that “[A] class action may extend beyond the boundaries of the state where the lead plaintiff brings the case.” (CR 13).
That the eligibility rule is "not commercial." The NCAA continues to feel that the eligibility rules they draft and pass, including the most recent Five-Year Eligibility Rule, is somehow exempt from antitrust laws. They made the same argument in the Colorado case. The court cited three separate, recent appellate rulings finding that eligibility rules are commercial in nature, and, therefore, are subject to antitrust laws. (CR 19-20). This is a point that the NCAA can’t seem to grasp: they are a commercial enterprise and their rules are commercial in nature.
There were other bewildering arguments, including the NCAA contending that the Class of 2022 athletes who competed in four seasons in four years lacked commonality.
Perhaps the most bewildering aspect of not only this case, but all of NCAA governance, is the complete lack of insight as to its position relative to antitrust laws. If you view their decisions through a pre-Alston lens, then their actions and arguments make sense: the NCAA operated with total impunity over athletes; whatever they said went. Times have changed; the NCAA’s thinking has not, which has led to its foreseeable demise.
Cedric breaks down college sports law issues like this one as they happen. Subscribe to his Substack: The Fine Print Docket to get the weekly newsletter.
Cedric Hopkins is an attorney and former Division I basketball player at the University of New Mexico. He's the author of The Fine Print, a book on the law and business of NIL and revenue sharing in college sports, and the founder of Hopkins Sports Law, where he delivers on-campus NIL, revenue-share, and agent-contract workshops, and helps athletes understand this complex new world of college sports. He's an educator, not an agent. Learn more at hopkinssportslaw.com.




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